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Caught in the Web: On and Off-Duty Use of Computers
Americans love their smaller, cheaper
and more mobile technology. Broad-
band, wireless and satellite connec-
tions allow individuals to be connected
all day at work, home and play. The
lines between home life and work life
blur. As a consequence, courts,
agencies, arbitrators and practitio-
ners must grapple with and resolve
tensions between personal privacy and
employer rights in the off-duty and on-
duty uses of cyberspace.  The following
examples show how these tensions
have changed in fifteen short years.
In 1993, Ms. Pastel, a high school
art teacher, displayed her photogra-
phy of nude subjects, including images
of herself and her boyfriend, at an out
of state gallery she visited in the
summer. In 2008, she created a
website entitled "Scenes of Nature"
that displayed the same images.  One
of her students found the website and
shared it with classmates.
In 1993, Mr. Party, a first year
nontenured teacher, went to the
neighborhood bar with college friends
and engaged in buffoonish, but legal,
behavior and sent a personal e-mail to
a friend about it. The e-mail remained
private. Conversely, in 2008, Mr.
Serious, a first year non-tenured
teacher and his friends wrote on their
Facebook1 page about their loutish,
I. Introduction
but legal behavior that occurred in
their homes over the summer and
included pictures. John, one of Mr.
Serious's students, asked for and was
given permission to be a "friend"2 of
Mr. Serious and gain access to his
Facebook page. Mr. Serious deleted all
the messages about the summer
parties but not the pictures.  John saw
the pictures.  Further, John noticed
that his older brother is a classmate of
one of Mr. Serious's friends, Stan.
John asked Stan if they could be
"friends" and have access to each
other's Facebook pages. Stan granted
permission to "friend" John and as a
result, John was able to  read Mr.
Serious' loutish comments on Stan's
site.
Jan, a teacher's aide, took a lunch
time drive  one day in 1993 to an "adult
store" and bought some "sex toys" to
bring home that night.  In 2008, Jan
visited Amazon.com at lunch time
from her school computer and ordered
clothes, kitchen supplies, and sex toys
and had them shipped to her home.
This article will explore some of the
challenges public employers, unions
and employees face with computers
and the internet. As individuals spend
more time on the Web and as
computers become ever more perva-
sive in the workplace, new areas of
tension and subjects of employee
discipline arise. Part II describes how
technology has changed the work-
place. Part III discusses issues arising
from the use of employer-provided
technology.  Part IV reviews types of
employee discipline issued for misuse
of employer equipment and for private
behavior that is disclosed on the Web.
Part IV also examines the standards
courts and arbitrators apply to these
situations.  Part V concludes with
some practical advice for employees.
II. From Fred Flintstone to
Only a few years ago, off-duty behavior
may have had only a remote possibility
of being censured by a government
employer. Today such off-duty behav-
ior poses greater risk of discipline by
employers. For example, in the
previous decade, Ms. Pastel's nude
photography likely would not have
been seen by her community unless
someone purchased one of her images
and then displayed it in the area. Now,
students, 96 percent of whom are
reported to spend nine hours a week on
social network sites, can find Ms.
Patel's photos on the internet and
circulate copies in the classroom.3  As
a result, the employer must decide
whether Ms. Pastel's legal, artful, off-
duty expression so disrupts the
workplace that the employer must
intervene. Similarly, Mr. Party had
greater control over information about
his 1990's private life, while Mr.
Serious, despite his efforts to control
similar information, is watching it
spiral out of control.
George Jetson: How Tech-
nology and the Web
Changed the Workplace
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In today’s technological age, the
infiltration of the World Web Wide into
nearly all aspects of private and work
life creates confusion as to what types
of private, off-duty conduct may have a
nexus to the workplace. Moreover, it
has become increasingly difficult to
define work time and work site. The
proliferation of Blackberries,4
smartphones5  and similar devices,
has resulted in employees responding
to e-mails, submitting work, and
updating electronic work information
at all hours of the day and night and
frequently at locations far distant
from the usual workplace.  Further,
these devices allow employees to
engage in personal tasks at the
workplace, during work or break time,
with no significant disruption of
work.6
Moreover, not only does life on the
Web blur boundaries of time, it also
creates additional "space" in which
people act and communicate. Our
community has greatly expanded
beyond the physical environment in
which we work and live to include
virtual space in which people commu-
nicate. For example, by actively
participating in online forums,  people
create close personal or professional
relationships with other individuals
throughout the world who share
similar interests and/or occupations.
Participants may share private
information with virtual friends who
they, most likely, have never met face-
to-face.
Social networking sites are becom-
ing increasingly common. On-line
social and professional networks such
as LinkedIn,7 Facebook, or MySpace8
assist people in maintaining and
establishing connections with indi-
viduals in distant locations as easily as
with the person next door. These
connections are often useful resources
for employees of a specified occupation
to communicate with others in the
field to discuss work-related issues
and experiences and to offer advice.
For example, U.S. News & World
Report recently told of thousands of
teachers giving their insight into
education and school experiences
through blogging.9 Educators are
participating in groups such as "K-3
Teachers Talk," on Facebook where
teachers around the world share
resources and experiences that are
successful in their classrooms.10
Further collaboration and networking
among educators takes place in the
International Society of Technology in
Education's (ISTE) virtual world
where teachers create an avatar in
Second Life11 and attend educator
conferences.12 Although teachers rec-
ognize the risks of making their views
more public through increased use of
the internet, they see enhanced
benefits of sharing their view with
others and learning colleagues' best
practices.
The expansion of social media on
the Web vastly expands the ease of
obtaining information about others
and allows individuals to distribute
information to a huge audience at
virtually no cost. As a result of this
ease of obtaining information, the
National Association of Colleges and
Employers reported in 2006 that over
20 percent of employers have expanded
their background check of prospective
employees to include web based
searches as easy as "Googling" the
applicant or reviewing social network-
ing sites.13
Today, the ease of distributing
information is in stark contrast to
even two decades ago. This change is
illustrated by two cases within the
Ninth Circuit.  Back in the quaint
days of 1988, in Burch v. Barker, the
court examined whether a school
district could restrict distribution of
350 copies of a four page "underground
newspaper."14 In Burch, the school
district policy required any material
written by a high school student be
approved by school officials before such
material could be distributed on school
premises or at school functions. The
policy applied to student writings not
contained in official school publica-
tions.  Students subsequently violated
the policy when they distributed
unauthorized material at a school-
sponsored class barbecue. The stu-
dents received minor discipline but
filed suit against the school district
alleging the policy violated their right
to freedom of speech.  Eventually, the
Ninth Circuit held that the policy
violated the students' first amend-
ment rights.
In contrast, in 2007, a district court
upheld the discipline of a student who
surreptitiously made video and audio
recordings of his teacher in class and
uploaded an edited version on MySpace
and YouTube for the world to see.15
The video was rapidly distributed
throughout the internet.
In this new technological world
where people openly communicate and
interact on the internet, the employer,
the citizen, the student, and the
student's parent have many opportu-
nities to gather information about the
public employee. Although sitting at
home engaging in private activities
with people all over the world, the
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employee is leaving a computer record
of that activity. Further, the employee
may be at home or in the workplace
and engaging in work activity one
minute and personal matters the next.
Both the overlapping of personal and
work matters, as well as the ease with
which information regarding an
employee can be discovered, raises
confusion for employers and employees
with respect to the following issues: (1)
whether  a particular activity is solely
private, (2) whether the employer can
restrict the employee's computer
activity, and (3) whether the employer
can gather information about employ-
ees.
III. Use of Employer-Pro-
vided Technology
A. What right does an employer
have to monitor an employee's
use of technology or conduct a
search to obtain electronic
records?
Labor relations statutes restrain
an employer's ability to monitor
employee use of technology. An
employer will commit an unfair labor
practice if it seeks to monitor employ-
ees' union activities. For example, in
Konop v Hawaiian Airlines,16 a pilot
established a password-protected web-
site on which he posted articles critical
of management and of his incumbent
union. Access was restricted to
Hawaiian Airlines employees and
expressly denied to management.
A vice president accessed the website
using the names of two  pilots with the
consent of the pilots.17  The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that Hawaiian's unautho-
rized access to the website was akin to
surveillance of employee protected
concerted activity and violated the
Railway Labor Act unless the airline
could establish a legitimate business
justification.18
Similarly, the employer will likely
have to bargain regarding the
installation of monitoring equipment.
For example, in National Steel Corp. v
NLRB,19  the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit upheld a National
Labor Relations Board holding that
the installation of hidden cameras is a
mandatory subject of bargaining
under the National Labor Relations
Act. Furthermore, equipment that
would record audio will violate Illinois
law unless there is individual
approval.20
Public employees have a constitu-
tional right to be free from unreason-
able searches. In Maes v Folberg,21  the
University of Illinois seized a laptop
computer purchased by the University
but frequently kept at home by
Professor Maes.22  Because the Univer-
sity had no policy regarding use of the
school's equipment, the court held that
Maes had a reasonable expectation of
privacy regarding those computer
records.23 Maes survived the
defendant's motion to dismiss because
she adequately pled that there was no
legitimate basis to search her
computer.24  However, an employer's
announcement that it will inspect
work computers may defeat its
employees' claims of a reasonable
expectation of privacy.25
Merely obtaining records of an
employee's electronic activity may
expose the employer to liability.  In
Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating
Co.,26  the Ontario, California Police
Department issued pagers to its police
officers.27 The employer's computer
usage policy did not address pagers or
text messaging,28  but an informal
policy provided that employees would
pay for any text usage above 25,000
characters.29 In 2002, the city ordered
a transcript of all pagers where
employees exceeded the limit. Officer
Quon exceeded the monthly limit by
more than 15,000 characters, by
sending personal messages, often of a
sexual nature.30  He sued the city and
the wireless carrier who provided the
transcripts to the city, alleging
violations of the Stored Communica-
tions Act,31 and the Fourth Amend-
ment. The court found that Quon
indeed had an expectation of privacy in
the content of his text messages based
on the city's informal policy and that
the wireless provider violated the
Stored Communications Act by releas-
ing the transcripts to the employer.32
Moreover, the court said that because
the city's informal policy allowed
personal use of the pagers, Quon could
not have committed misconduct, and
thus a formal proceeding could not be
instituted against him.33 The
employer's failure to align its
computer policy with the actual
technology used left it open to liability.
B. What are the consequences
of misuse of Employer's technol-
ogy?
Assuming an employer legally
obtains information about an
employee's electronic activities, what
may the employer do? An initial
question will be whether the employee
misused the employer's equipment or
violated a legitimate acceptable use
policy (AUP).34 Misuse of an employer's
equipment or violation of the
employer's AUP creates a link
between the misconduct and work. In
the illustration at the beginning of this
article, Jan used the school computer
to purchase various personal items
during her lunch break. Whether and
to what extent Jan could be disciplined
would depend on the employer's rules
and practices regarding employee use
of school equipment during personal
time. Additionally, the search and
purchase of "sex toys" might aggra-
vate the situation if the employer could
prove any additional harm due to
potential exposure to students or to
other employees who might object to
seeing such images in the workplace.
As discussed below, the employer
would need to show what actual or at
least potential harm occurred. In her
defense, Jan would need to show what
measures she took to reduce that
harm.
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Generally, absent specific work
rules defining proper use of employer
technology, employees will be permit-
ted occasional personal use of employer
equipment, such as making a personal
phone call, without disciplinary
consequences. To discipline the em-
ployee, the employer needs to prove
that the employee's use was excessive
or interfered with work. For example,
in Independent School Dist. 284,
Wayzeta, Minnesota,35  a teacher was
terminated for personal use of the
school computer. The teacher admit-
ted to buying his fiancée's engagement
ring on eBay and helping plan his
wedding during class time.36  The
school alleged he was spending entire
class periods engaged in personal
business on the computer rather than
instructing students.37 However, the
union's computer expert challenged
the District's allegation that each of
the 55,000 URL hits noted on the
teacher's computer during a 20–day
period consisted of the teacher actually
clicking on a mouse. Both the union
and the school's experts agreed that
the "hits" could have been the browser
refreshing.38  The arbitrator found
that the school failed to prove grossly
excessive misuse by the employee and
there was, therefore, no just cause to
terminate the teacher. Accordingly,
the arbitrator reduced the penalty to a
two month suspension.39
IV. Off-Duty Conduct in the
Internet Age
A. Greater Exposure of Private
Behavior Makes Employers
Nervous
As illustrated in the examples from
Part I and in several cases discussed
below, private acts can be more easily
exposed either by intentional self-
disclosure or by the nefarious acts of
others. A spurned spouse may inten-
tionally publish private photos.  What
once may have been surreptitiously
circulated, now can be widely
distributed throughout a community
in minutes.  A teacher may not know
she was photographed engaging in
embarrassing activity and then years
later learn parents have stumbled
upon the photos on the Web.  Once
these photos become public, the
employer wonders how it should
respond when its employees are
expected  to be role models. All involved
parties are confused as to where to
properly draw the line between private
conduct beyond the employer's reach
and conduct so affecting employment
as to justify discipline.
B. What are the Standards for
Disciplining Employees for Off-
Duty Conduct?
1. Legislating Morality
The Illinois School Code has long
explicitly provided that school boards
can "dismiss a teacher for . . .
immorality."40 Many states have
similar "morality" statutes for teach-
ers. The idea of what private behavior
is immoral changes over time. In 1972,
Elizabeth Reinhardt was fired as a
teacher because she became pregnant
while not married.41   Fortunately for
Ms. Reinhardt, the Appellate Court
reversed the dismissal. It is highly
unlikely any school board in Illinois
today would even consider a termina-
tion on similar grounds.
2. Showing a Connection be-
tween the Off-Duty Conduct and
the Employee's Work and Abil-
ity to Perform Official Duties
Decision makers tread on thin ice
when attempting to define and then
enforce morality. Consequently, courts
and arbitrators require employers to
prove a nexus between the off-duty
conduct and the job.  The California
Supreme Court in Morrison v. State
Board of Education42  recognized that
terms such as "immorality" are highly
subjective, so it established unfitness
for duty standards now used by many
other courts and arbitrators. To
determine whether conduct indicates
a teacher's unfitness for duty, the
court said it would examine:
1) the likelihood that conduct may
have adversely affected students or
fellow teachers;
2) the degree of such adversity;
3) the proximity or remoteness in
time of the conduct;
4) the type of teaching certificate
held by the party (or the ages and
maturity of the students);
5) the extenuating or aggravating
circumstances, if any;
6) the praiseworthiness or blame-
worthiness of the motives resulting in
the conduct;
7) the likelihood of the conduct
would recur; and
8) the extent to which punishment
would affect the constitutional rights
of the teacher or other teachers.43
In Morrison, the court was called
upon to decide whether a male teacher
with a clean criminal record and an
impeccable record as a teacher should
lose his teaching credentials due to
homosexual conduct outside of the
workplace. The petitioner had, in the
course of providing informal marital
counseling to a male friend and
colleague, engaged in sexual contact
with this colleague. This colleague
ultimately reported it to the school,
prompting the petitioner to resign.
Over a year later, the State Board of
Education revoked the petitioner's
teaching credentials.44   In reversing
the revocation decision, the court held
that the board had not come forward
with sufficient evidence to demon-
strate the petitioner's unfitness to
teach. Relying on the unfitness
factors, the court reasoned that the
sexual conduct was a six-year-old
isolated incident that was already
three years old when the credentials
were revoked. Moreover, the petitioner's
motives "involved neither dishonesty
nor viciousness, and the emotional
pressures on both petitioner and [his
colleague] suggest[ed] the presence of
extenuating circumstances."  Finally,
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the court found no evidence that the
petitioner's "ability to command the
respect and confidence of students"
would be impaired.45
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
has similarly warned that a public
employer enters dangerous territory
when it attempts to determine
standards of morality.46    The court
held that the nexus standard is critical
to curbing government excess:
The rational nexus requirement is
perhaps nowhere more important
than where an adverse action is
taken against an individual on the
basis of lawful, consensual, social
behavior that is considered by his
superiors to be "immoral" or
"notoriously disgraceful." Without
the limitations provided by the
nexus requirement, such a stan-
dard would give the [government]
free reign to purge itself of persons
found to be distasteful . . . A
pronouncement of "immorality"
tends to discourage careful analy-
sis because it unavoidably con-
notes a violation of divine,
Olympian, or otherwise universal
standards of rectitude.47
Whether there is a nexus between
the conduct and employment will
depend on the work of both the
employer and employee. An IRS
employee who fails to file a tax return
can be disciplined by her employer
because she is supposed to be a role
model on tax compliance.48   Similarly,
a HUD employee charged with
enforcing federal housing laws can be
disciplined for being a slum landlord
while off-duty.49 Conversely, a librar-
ian would likely not face discipline by
her employer for either offense.  But a
driver's education teacher arguably
would be more likely to face discipline
for an off-duty DUI conviction than a
physics teacher.50 Disciplinary actions
based on off-duty conduct trigger a
factually intensive, case-by-case analy-
sis.
Three recent dismissal decisions
with varying outcomes are illustrative
of the challenges facing public
employees when their private behavior
is publicly exposed.
First, an elementary school in
L'Anse Creuse, Michigan terminated
a teacher for her behavior over the
summer at a couple's joint bachelor-
bachelorette party.51  At a notorious
outdoor summer party area, manne-
quins were rigged to allow party goers
to drink shots of alcohol while
appearing to perform oral sex on the
mannequins.52  Unbeknownst to the
teacher and without her permission,
someone took pictures of her making it
appear she engaged in oral sex in a
public area.53 The pictures were
uploaded to a website about the party
area.54 Two years later parents
discovered the website, and students,
community members and school staff
viewed the pictures.55  When ques-
tioned by the school administration,
the teacher said what she did off school
property and off school time was "not
anybody's business."56   The teacher
expressed no regret or remorse;
although, after the dispute escalated
she wrote to the website operator and
asked that the photographs be
removed.57
The teacher's discipline and termi-
nation was entirely based on the
school's claim that the teacher
engaged in immoral and unprofes-
sional activity that was contrary to the
school's sexuality curriculum and was
in disregard for her responsibilities as
a role model.58  Under the Michigan
Teacher Tenure Act, the school
suspended the teacher with pay
pending the outcome of the dismissal
hearing.59 Two cases resulted: a
grievance arbitration and a teacher
tenure hearing.  As to the grievance
proceeding, the Michigan Education
Association grieved the teacher's
suspension; and, arbitrator William
Daniel found that the school could not
establish just cause for any disci-
pline.60  However, in the end, the
arbitrator held that the paid suspen-
sion was not grievable since the school
was acting in accordance with the
Teacher Tenure Act.61
Even so, when evaluating the
merits of the school's conduct
regardless of whether the suspension
was grievable, the arbitrator found
that the school would not have just
cause to discipline her for her "adult
activity of a salacious nature" because
the teacher's activity did not involve
the school or her capacity to teach.62
After the grievance hearing, the school
terminated the teacher, clearly disre-
garding the grievance arbitrator's
opinion that such discipline would not
be for just cause.63   Once discharged,
the teacher appealed her dismissal at
the Michigan State Tenure Commis-
sion.64 Much like the school, the
Tenure Commission did not consider
the arbitrator's decision; however,
similar to the arbitrator, the Commis-
sion concluded that the teacher's
behavior "was not professional miscon-
duct."65  The Commission did not doubt
the sincerity of the school community's
objection to the teacher's conduct, but
when evaluating the circumstances
surrounding the teacher's actions, the
Commission found the conduct did not
involve a school activity, students or
teaching obligations.66 The activity
was not illegal,67 it harmed no one and
there was no evidence that children
were present.   Further, the teacher
never discussed her activity while at
school.68   The Commission ultimately
concluded that since the teacher's acts
were not misconduct, the negative
publicity concerning those acts was
irrelevant.69 Thus, the Commission
ordered the school to reinstate the
teacher with backpay.70
In a similar case, a school district
in Warren City, Ohio dismissed a high
school teacher whose nude pictures
were posted on the Web by his
estranged wife.71 Early in the
3. Applying the Nexus Test in
the Electronic Frontier
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teacher's marriage, he had posed for a
picture in the couple's bedroom while
"exhibiting an exaggerated smile with
his hand on his erect penis."72  As the
marriage deteriorated, his wife threat-
ened to embarrass him at work with
the photos.73  The teacher later learned
from a fellow high school teacher that
more nude pictures appeared on a
MySpace site which had been created,
presumably by the ex-wife, using a
name similar to his.74  The site stated
that he desired to party with "girls,
guys or goats" and included multiple
false blog entries, designed to
embarrass the teacher.75   In addition,
the photos were uploaded to two dating
sites.76   Students printed the photos,
the local newspaper identified the
websites and the pictures were posted
on the front door of a local pub.77  Four
days later, the teacher began efforts to
shut down the websites.78  However,
the teacher's efforts could not curtail
the harm already caused by all of the
photos and statements.79
In response, the school board placed
the teacher on home assignment and
launched an investigation into the
teacher's online activity.80   During the
investigation, the school board found,
that in addition to the ex-wife's
salacious conduct, the teacher admit-
ted he twice inappropriately used the
school district's email server.81   The
first incident involved an email to his
wife which included a picture of the
couple's "baby daughter with superim-
posed adult naked female breasts."82
The second email was of an article
about orgasms and sexual health.83
Based on both the publicity of the nude
photos and the impropriety of the
teacher's two emails, the school board
terminated the teacher's contract, and
the teacher grieved his dismissal.84
Arbitrator Thomas Skulina had "no
doubt in my mind that a frontal nude
photograph of a male with a
supercilious grin and his hand on his
erect penis qualifies as immoral, aka
obscene."85   The obscenity, though,
was not the basis for the arbitrator's
decision, and he later qualified his
judgment by saying it would not be
proper for an arbitrator "to opine about
the morality of the photo play of this
married couple in the privacy of their
bedroom."86   Instead, the arbitrator
concluded that the teacher's actions
and inactions after the photo was
taken justified his dismissal.87
More specifically, the arbitrator
determined that a person holding a
"responsible position at his place of
employment" has a duty to "secure
obscene photos of himself."88   He also
faulted the teacher for not hiring an
attorney to help him get the photos or
to legally restrain his wife from
disseminating them.89   The teacher
made a pro se effort to get an order of
protection, but did not attempt to get
an order regarding the pictures and
did not make any disclosure about the
pictures to the prosecutor.90   Further,
the arbitrator faulted the teacher for
not warning his principal about his
wife's threats to use the pictures and
for the teacher's failure to get help
from the principal or from the
computer experts at the school.91
Thus, the arbitrator's final conclusion
rested not only on the content of the
photos, but rather on the publicity of
the photos and the lack of effort on the
teacher's part to rein in that
publicity.92
Both of these cases show that
behavior occurring far away in place
and time from the workplace can
intrude into the workplace because of
third parties' use of the internet. The
"offense" in both cases was very
similar – photos of teachers engaged in
sexual activity. However, the Warren
City teacher had advanced warning
that the pictures could be disclosed,
while the other teacher was blindsided.
Critically, the Warren City teacher did
not take any action to prevent the
disclosure of the picture or to warn his
employer that the disclosure might
occur.
Similarly, the arbitrator in Wash-
ington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority determined that the actions
which an employee takes to mitigate
the harm of an electronic communica-
tion may be critical to a just cause
analysis.93  Here, the employee, a
white Washington, D.C. Metropolitan
police officer, received a racially and
sexually offensive "joke" from a friend
as a text message on his phone.94   The
officer believed that he deleted the
message from his phone.95   Instead,
while off-duty, he had inadvertently
forwarded the message to his wife, in-
laws, co-workers and others.96  After
his displeased wife told him what he
had done, he attempted to find out
whom he had sent the message to so
that he could apologize.97 Most
notably, the officer had inadvertently
forwarded the racially offensive text
message to an African-American co-
worker.98   Understandably, the co-
worker who received the message was
highly offended.99
Seeking forgiveness, the police
officer immediately apologized to the
co-worker and attempted to do so again
later in the day.100   However, once the
department's Division of Professional
Responsibility and Inspections found
out about the racially charged text
message, the officer was fired for
discrediting himself and his depart-
ment.101   The officer's union grieved
the termination, but the arbitrator
concluded that this set of facts created
a sufficient nexus to the workplace
because the offensive message went to
a co-worker.102 The arbitrator, though,
reduced the dismissal to a suspension
because the action was inadvertent
and because the employee immedi-
ately apologized and sought forgive-
ness.103
V. Conclusion and Words of
Advice
To attract and retain talented
employees in a world wired and
webbed, employers must recognize the
importance of a host of new
boundaries.  Employers are con-
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fronted with lines between work time
and personal time, between work
space and personal space that are more
blurred than ever before.  Because of
this difficulty, the employer can no
longer tightly control its image or its
message.
On the other side of the equation,
employees need to understand that
today's employer may be uncomfort-
able in this new reality.  Given the
recent focus on the nexus test,
employees need to know when they are
potentially harming themselves or
their employer. The speed and dis-
tance at which messages are broadcast
requires that employees be vigilant at
protecting their own image by acting
quickly when their employment may
be adversely affected.
So what advice does an education
union lawyer give union members
about their off-duty conduct on the
internet?  As with other legal issues,
the client first needs to fully assess the
value that he or she places on the
activity: What pleasure or gain are you
receiving?  Then, the client should
fully assess the risks associated with
the activity: How can this activity put
your employment at risk?   Based on
the calculation of both value and risk,
the client can come to a decision about
what conduct they choose to partake
in.  The following are a few tips to help
public employees reduce liability by
being mindful of the new risks
presented by the increasingly techno-
logical workplace:
1. Know the employer's rules and
follow them. If you are using your
employer's resources, understand and
abide by the Acceptable Use Policy.  A
large percentage of employee misuse
occurs, not because the employee
intends to disobey the employer, but
rather because the employee does not
know the rules about computer usage.
If you are required to sign a policy
about technology use, then you should
fully read or understand this policy,
ask questions about confusing lan-
guage or unstated issues and retain a
copy of the rules for reference when
questions later arise.
2. Assume you have no privacy
regarding computer postings and
email when you use your employer-
sponsored system. Only post informa-
tion that you would feel comfortable
reading on the front page of your local
newspaper.
3. Carefully determine what image
you want to display to your various
work acquaintances and take steps to
control those images available to your
business affiliations. For teachers,
this means maintaining professional
boundaries with students, parents,
and other teachers. For police officers,
this means maintaining similar
boundaries with your fellow officers
and with the public.  If you have
personal pages on social networking
sites, consider creating a separate one
that is open to students and parents.
Do not give students access to your
other profiles.  So long as you do not
have an interest in showing the world
your life, keep access to your personal
pages exclusive to only your friends,
family, and other persons whom you
actually know. Set the same profes-
sional boundaries on-line that you do
in the classroom.  If you wouldn't talk
about last night's party in front of your
class of students, then don't post a
description of the party on a personal
page which is open to the public at
large.
4. Recognize generational differ-
ences in communication styles. Some
older readers (i.e., supervisors, par-
ents) may be dismayed about the
personal information younger employ-
ees are willing to publicly disclose.
Don't wait to evaluate the content of
your information until it is too late (i.e.
after your supervisor has suspended
you for a personal story that you
initially thought was appropriate.)
5. With the internet, prevention is
key.  Addressing a comment before it is
posted is the best way to control it.
Information on the internet can spread
throughout the community and the
world with more speed than an
infection spreads through the body.
Remember that it may be easier to get
rid of a tattoo than it is to remove a
comment that you have posted on the
Web.
6. Don't visit sites or access emails of
even a remotely questionable nature
while using any computer that may be
subject to an investigation.  This tip
works only to the extent that you
follow Tip #1, knowing the Acceptable
Use Policy (i.e. knowing which
computers may be subject to search).
A "deleted" computer file, including e-
mail, can often be accessed by an
experienced investigator and may
even reveal how much time was spent
accessing or viewing certain sites.
7. Assume that information posted
on the internet, even information on a
private profile with limited access, is
accessible to everyone you know and,
more importantly, by those you don't
know.  You may not know everyone
who is viewing your site.  In fact, this
is quite likely.  Assume students,
parents, colleagues, and supervisors
may gain access at some point. Even
private social networking profiles may
be cached by someone who has access
to the profile, and then disclosed to
others who may not have direct access
or permission from you.
8. Assume that no posting is
anonymous. Supposedly anonymous
postings could be traced back to you.
Unless a person is an expert at using
the most advanced software and
techniques available, a posting leaves
a trail back to the computer from
which it was posted. Your internet
service provider or website owner
could be subpoenaed  to indentify you
as the one who posted the content.
Once again, a comparison to the real
world is appropriate: you would not
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assume that wearing a ski-mask
would entirely prevent a later
investigation from discovering your
identity, so don't assume that
leaving your name off of an internet
post is a foolproof method of
concealing your identity either.
9. "Investigate" yourself to see what
others might find if they did their
own investigation.  Perform regular
searches to locate on-line records
about you, and attempt to remove
negative information.  Typing your
name into the search engine
"Google" is a common practice by
employers and could reveal personal
or even false information about you.
Once you find information, you can
take steps to change or delete the
information that you do not wish
displayed.  For example, many web
hosts such as MySpace will assist
educators and others in removing
false or offensive profiles by sending
an email to schoolcare@myspace.
com.  Similar services are offered by
other websites.
If you would like to participate in a
discussion of the issues raised in
this article, please go to http://
www.facebook.com/pages/Illinois-
Education-Association/3110543
2855#/topic.php?uid=31105432855
&topic=6299. You will need a
Facebook profile to join the discus-
sion. I look forward to your ideas,
reactions and suggestions to this
topic. See you on the Web!
?
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Recent
Developments
Recent Developments is a regular feature
of The Illinois Public Employee Relations
Report. It highlights recent legal develop-
ments of interest to the public employment
relations community. This issue focuses on
developments under the two collective
bargaining statutes, and the equal employ-
ment opportunity laws.
IELRA Developments
Confidential Employees
In Midwest Central Community Unit
School District 191 v. Midwest Central
Education Association, IEA-NEA, Case No.
2008-UC-0004-S (IELRB 2008), the IELRB
found that the district's Data Director was
not a confidential employee under Section
 The district argued that the Data
Director’s duties resulted in unfettered
access to all district computer files,
including those containing collective bar-
gaining and personnel information. The
district further maintained that the Data
Director's role in several specific investiga-
tions  demonstrated the position's access to
sensitive confidential material. This investi-
gatory and reporting role, the district
contended, rendered the Data Director a
confidential employee.
Under the labor nexus test of Section
2(n)(i), confidential employees are those
whose duties entail "assist[ing] and act[ing]
in a confidential capacity to persons who
formulate, determine and effectuate man-
agement policies with regard to labor
relations."  The IELRB found the Data
Director's investigatory duties insufficient
to satisfy the labor nexus test.
The Board held also that the Data
Director was not confidential under the
access test, which requires "unfettered
access ahead of time" to information
concerning "pending collective-bargaining
policies."  Collective-bargaining policy infor-
mation would include the district's strategy
in an organizing campaign, bargaining
proposals, or contract administration infor-
mation.  The IELRB applied the factors
from Board of Control of Lake County Area
Vocation System, 20 PERI  5 (IELRB 2004):
"1) whether there is evidence of actual
access to confidential collective bargaining
information in the regular course of duties;
2) job description; and 3) the employee's
day-to-day activities."  Actual access is
defined as “real” and not simply “incidental”
access in the regular course of an
employee’s duties.
The district failed to establish the Data
Director had actual access to confidential
collective bargaining information.  Specifi-
cally, the employee's duty to examine
confidential financial and other files in the
course of an investigation failed to reveal
access to information regarding organizing
campaigns, district bargaining proposals, or
contract administration information. Fur-
ther, the Data Director job description
mentioned confidential information, but did
not reference labor relations information.
Finally, the district failed to demonstrate
that the Data Director's access to confiden-
tial labor relations information in her day-
to-day activities is "real" or anymore than
"incidental."
IPLRA Developments
Duty to Bargain
In Harvey Park District v. American Fed'n
of Professionals, 24 PERI 110 (Ill. App. Ct.
4th Dist. 2008), the Fourth District
Appellate Court upheld the ILRB State
Panel's dismissal of an unfair labor practice
charge against the union where it refused
to sign a collective bargaining agreement
after the union membership voted against
ratification.
In July 2005, the union was certified as
the exclusive bargaining representative of
certain park district employees and the
parties began negotiations. When the
parties reached an agreement, the union
submitted the contract to a membership
vote which failed to ratify. The union
informed the employer of the failure to
ratify and requested that the parties
resume bargaining. The employer refused,
demanded the union sign the agreement
and filed the unfair labor practice charge
alleging violation of sectins 7 and 10(b)(4) of
the IPLRA.
?
2(n)(i)-(ii) of the IELRA.
The Data Director's essential function
was "to operate, coordinate and supervise
all aspects of the MCUD Local Area
Network (LAN) and the MCUD link to the
CivicNet Wide Area Network (WAN) to
provide fair and equitable access to
electronic resources for all MCUD students
and staff."  According to the job description,
"confidentiality in terms of passwords, log-
ins and student/staff private information is
essential."
The court affirmed the ILRB’s  dismissal
of the change, concluding that although the
IPLRA does not require a  ratification vote,
the union's constitution required ratifica-
tion before signing any agreement. The
court rejected the employer's argument
that negotiators are presumed to have
authority to negotiate and agree to any
agreement, unless such right is "clearly,
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EEO Developments
Disability Discrimination
On September 25, 2008, President Bush
signed the ADA Amendments Act of 2008
("Act").  The Act, which takes effect on
January 1, 2009, aims to restore to the
definition of "disability" under the ADA the
broad remedial scope that Congress origi-
nally intended.
The Act retains the three-prong defini-
tion of "disability" as originally enacted in
the ADA in 1990: “(A) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or (C)
being regarded as having such an impair-
ment."  In the Act's Findings and Purposes
Section, Congress expressly rejected the
Supreme Court's determination in Toyota
Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534
U.S. 184, 197 (2002), that the terms
"substantially" and "major" in the definition
of "disability" "need to be interpreted strictly
to create a demanding standard for
qualifying as disabled." The Act requires the
"definition of disability to be construed in
favor of broad coverage of individuals
under this Act, to the maximum extent
permitted by the terms of this Act."
As to this first prong, the Act signifi-
cantly expands the  meanings of "substan-
tially limits" and "major life activities."
Substantial limitation under current Su-
preme Court precedent requires an impair-
ment that "prevents or severely restricts"
an individual from performing major life
activities.  Additionally, the Court requires
one to be "presently – not potentially or
hypothetically – substantially limited in
order to demonstrate a disability." Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482
(1999).  Finally, the Court requires lower
courts and the EEOC to consider mitigating
measures since an impairment "corrected
by mitigating measures" does not "substan-
tially limit."  In Sutton, the plaintiff had
severe visual myopia that could be
corrected to perfect 20/20 vision with
glasses.  The Court held the myopia was not
a disability because with the mitigating
measure of glasses, the plaintiff was not
The court found that the ALJ gave no
weight to evidence of the sergeants
discretionary authority to discipline subor-
dinates for minor infractions.  The ALJ
concluded that because all disciplinary
action sergeants took against subordinates
needed to be reported to the police chief,
the sergeants did not have discretion to
discipline.
The Appellate Court noted that with
respect to police employment, a statutory
unequivocally, and expressly preserved at
the bargaining table."   The court provided
five grounds for rejecting this assertion:  (1)
there was no past history indicating that
ratification was not necessary, (2) the
parties did not identify ground rules for the
bargaining sessions, (3) the union’s consti-
tution required ratification by the member-
ship, (4) no union representative stated
that he was not bound by a majority
ratification and (5) the employer did not act
in a way to clarify the union representative's
authority.
Supervisors
In Village of Hazel Crest v. ILRB, 24 PERI
106 (Ill. App.Ct.1st Dist. 2008), the First
District Appellate Court reversed an ILRB
State Panel decision and held that village
police sergeants were statutory supervisors
within the meaning of the IPLRA.  The
police department was headed by a police
chief with two deputy chiefs. Five sergeants
sought representation. Sergeants were
assigned to a patrol shift and during that
shift performed administrative functions
and patrolled the streets. Each sergeant
oversaw the work of about four patrol
officers, and continually monitored subor-
dinates, documenting wrongdoing and
completing performance evaluations.  Ser-
geants had authority to discipline subordi-
nates through training, counseling and
verbal warnings.
The evidence demonstrated that the
sergeants exercised discretion to counsel,
train and issue verbal warnings to
subordinates for minor infractions. All
verbal warnings were documented in a log
book and remained for two years during
which time the log book could be referred to
in evaluations.
supervisor need not devote a preponder-
ance of his employment exercising supervi-
sory functions.  According to section 3(r), a
police officer is a supervisor if he (1)
performs principal work substantially dif-
ferent from that of his subordinates; (2) has
authority in the interest of the employer to
perform one or more of the 11 supervisory
functions or to effectively recommend such
action; and (3) consistently uses indepen-
dent judgment in performing or recom-
mending the enumerated actions.
  In applying City of Freeport v. ISLRB,
354 135 Ill. 2d 499, 554 N.E.2d 155 (1990),
the court concluded that the verbal
reprimands issued by the sergeants met the
definition of discipline because the repri-
mands were documented in the police
department's logbook and were referred to
for future discipline.  Although City of
Freeport established that the verbal repri-
mands must be documented and placed in
an employee's personnel file, the Appellate
Court did not distinguish placement of the
reprimands in the logbooks as opposed to in
personnel files.
The court rejected the union's position
that the sergeants did not exercise
independent judgment in recommending
greater discipline   where those recommen-
dations were independently reviewed by
the deputy chief and chief.  The court did
not find it significant that in a para-military
organization recommended discipline would
be reviewed by superiors and stated that "a
recommendation need not be rubber-
stamped to constitute discipline within the
meaning of Section 3(r) of the Act."  The
village had presented evidence that the
sergeants recommended greater discipline
in two instances and although the ALJ
concluded that the infrequency of such
action indicated that the authority was not
exercised consistently, the court disagreed.
Again citing City of Freeport, it noted, "[i]t is
the authority to use independent judgment
imposing discipline, rather than how often
such discipline is imposed, [that] is
important."  The Court concluded that the
sergeants were exempted from the IPLRA
as statutory supervisors.
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presently substantially limited.  The Court's
holding was expanded in the companion
case of Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527
U.S. 555, 565-66 (1999), that the mitigation
rule applied not only to "artificial aids," but
also to "measures undertaken, whether
consciously or not, with the body's own
systems."
In the Act's Findings and Purposes
Section, Congress expressly rejects the
Court's "prevents or severely restricts"
definition of substantial limitation as well as
the EEOC's definition of "significantly
restricted." However, the Act fails to
substitute an alternative definition.  Rather,
Congress has opted to punt the issue to the
EEOC, charging it to "revise that portion of
its current regulations that defines the
term "substantially limits" as "significantly
restricted" to be consistent with this Act,
including the amendments made by this
Act."  The Act effectively limits the Sutton
case to its facts by effacing the requirement
of considering mitigating measures except
for the "ameliorative effects of   . . . .
ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses."  The
Act mandates that the "substantially limits"
determination "shall be made without
regard to the ameliorative effects of
mitigating measures."  The Act is very
specific in illustratively listing artificial
mitigating measures that shall not be
considered in ascertaining whether an
impairment is substantially limiting,  includ-
ing: medication, medical supplies, prosthetic
limbs, low-vision devices, mobility devices,
and oxygen therapy equipment. Natural
mitigat-ing measures, explained in the Act
as "learned behavioral or adaptive neuro-
logical modifications," may also no longer be
considered in the "substantially limits"
analysis.
Under current Supreme Court prece-
dent, "major life activities" are those that
are of "central importance to most people's
daily lives." The Act enumerates the
following volitional major life activities:
caring for oneself, performing manual
tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping,
walking, standing, lifting, bending, speak-
ing, breathing, learning, reading, concen-
trating, thinking, communicating, and
working.  Also enumerated are non-
volitional major bodily functions, including
functions of the:  immune system, normal
cell growth, digestive system, bowels,
bladder, neurological system, brain, respi-
ratory system, circulatory system, endo-
crine system, and reproductive system.
Neither of these lists is exhaustive, and the
Act admonishes against strict interpreta-
tions of the word "major."  Congress
expressly rejects the Court's strict interpre-
tation of "major life activity" as needing to
be "of central importance to most people's
daily lives."
Perhaps the Act’s most sweeping changes
are to the  "regarded as" prong of
"disability."  To be regarded as disabled, the
Supreme Court has required  that either an
employee be (1) wrongly perceived as
having an impairment that substantially
limits performance of a major life activity or
(2) wrongly perceived as being substan-
tially limited by an actual impairment that
does not actually limit the employee
substantially. In both scenarios, the em-
ployer must perceive a substantial limita-
tion and discriminate against the employee
on the basis of that perception.  Ostensibly,
the Court has presumed the "regarded as"
prong defines "disability" in the same
manner as under the first prong.  The ADA
Amendments Act turns the foregoing
analysis on its head.
Under the Act, an employee is regarded
as disabled whenever subjected to discrimi-
nation based on an "actual or perceived
physical or mental impairment whether or
not the impairment limits or is perceived to
limit a major life activity." This language is
a fundamental change in the "regarded as"
prong and is indicative of the Act's complete
paradigm shift to expansive coverage.
Now an employee must merely demon-
strate the employer perceived an impair-
ment and discriminated because of it.
Genetic Discrimination
Effective November 21, 2009, the federal
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination
Act of 2008 ("GINA") prohibits employers
from failing to hire, discharging, classify-
ing, segregating, or discriminating against
an employee because of genetic informa-
tion.  GINA also prohibits employers from
requesting, requiring, or purchasing an
employee's genetic information, except
where necessary to comply with the Family
and Medical Leave Act, or to genetically
monitor the effects of toxic substances in
the workforce, or to perform DNA analysis
for law enforcement purposes at a forensic
laboratory.
GINA adopts Title VII's definition of
employer, which includes all employers that
have fifteen or more employees each
working day for at least twenty weeks out
of a year.  GINA also adopts several Title VII
procedures, including requirements for
administrative filings with the EEOC, and
Title VII remedies, including attorney's fees
and equitable relief. GINA also includes a
no-retaliation provision comparable to that
found in Title VII.  Jury trials are available
in GINA cases.
There are several areas of concern for
employers regarding the use of biometrics
(genetic and other unique physical identifi-
ers like retinal scans), including protecting
the data from identity theft and protecting
the equipment from employee vandalism or
manipulation.  GINA increases these
concerns due to its broad definition of
genetic information, which includes genetic
test results for individuals and their
families, the manifestation of a particular
disease or disorder in a family member, and
participation in genetic research and
requests for genetic services.  Employers
could unintentionally acquire such infor-
mation while trying to accommodate
employees under the ADA or with non-
FMLA leave.
GINA allows disclosure of genetic
information only in limited circumstances:
to the employee upon request, to a health
researcher, as directed by a court order, to a
government official investigating compli-
ance with GINA, or in connection with
federal and state family and medical leave
statutory provisions. In all other circum-
stances, employers may be liable for
inadvertent disclosure of employee genetic
information. ?
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